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 ABSTRACT  
 
The paper seeks to improve our understanding of the concept of critical junctures.  Critical junctures 
have been used to provide avenues for exploring change in historical institutionalism.  However, the 
critical junctures concept, as it has developed, lacks rigour.  We have no means of saying, with 
certainty, what is a critical juncture.  If we cannot define a critical juncture the issue of path 
dependency becomes nebulous, as we cannot be certain as to path origins.  Over the years the critical 
junctures concept has been used in conjunction with “watersheds” in politics, but without any 
quantifications.  This has left the approach in a quandary.  Consequently, historical institutionalists 
have been more inclined to look to other approach to identify change. 
Improving upon the critical junctures approach involves specifying standards that enable 
identification of levels of change.  The remoulded approach is employed here in examining change in 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions’ (ICTU) influence over public policy in 1959.  It will identify if this 
change in the unions’ influence over public policy constituted a critical juncture.  This example will 
illustrate how the remoulded approach reduces uncertainty surrounding the issue of what level of 
change is necessary to constitute a critical juncture.  What is more, the remoulded framework is 
applicable to any social science research concerned with change. 
 
Introduction 
For historical institutionalism the focus is choices made early in the history of a 
polity.  These choices will have a persistent influence (Peters, 1999, p. 210).  When a 
government initiative starts down a particular path there is a tendency for choices to 
persist.  Choices made at time T influence choices at time T+1 (Berman, 1998, p. 
380).  Policies are path dependent, and once initiated continue until a sufficiently 
strong force deflects them (Krasner 1984, p. 240).  Consequently, institutions are not 
easily altered when conditions change (Schickler 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998). 
Historical institutionalism is effective at explaining what happens, and in 
weaving a narrative that captures a good deal of the reality of history.  However, these 
characterisations of history come close to being functionalist.  The problem is that 
there are cases in which institutions change in unexpected ways, and the approach 
appears at a loss to explain them.  ‘This is the weakest and most difficult point in 
institutionalist analysis,’ (Rothstein, 1996, p. 153).  ‘Historical institutionalism is not 
a fertile source of explanations for change in organisations and institutions’ (Peters, 
1999, p. 70).   
However, Pierson (2004, pp. 5-6) argues that many of the key concepts needed 
to underpin analyses of temporal processes, such as path dependency and critical 
junctures have received only limited discussion.  This raises questions as to both the 
understanding, and employment, of these concepts.  Consequently, critical junctures 
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have remained under examined and insufficiently specified.  This paper focuses on 
critical junctures, seeking to outline a framework within which to identify them, and 
consequently the change points.  If a critical juncture can be identified then we can 
point to a period of change as significant with a greater degree of confidence than 
previously. 
 This paper, in seeking to improve our understanding of critical junctures, is 
divided into a number of sections.  The first section focuses on the issue of path 
dependency, and the problems within political science (historical institutionalism) in 
identifying change.  The next section discusses the characteristics of critical junctures, 
the use of the approach, its weaknesses, and how the approach is remoulded to give it 
the rigour it previously lacked.  Thereafter the paper discusses the methodology 
employed, and case study undertaken, to test the remoulded approach.  The 
conclusion will summarise the arguments and findings of the paper. 
   
 
An Exploration of Institutional Change 
 
There has been surprisingly little attentiveness in political science to the specifically 
temporal dimensions of social processes.  ‘In contemporary social science, the past 
serves primarily as a source of empirical material, rather than as a spur to serious 
investigations of how politics happens over time’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 4).  An 
exploration of the temporal dimensions of social processes is the weakest link in 
social science’s historical turn.  We lack a clear outline of why the investigation of 
issues of temporality is critical to an understanding of social processes. 
 Exploring social mechanisms with a strong temporal dimension can address 
the desire of historically orientated scholars to capture how history matters.  The 
identification and clarification of such mechanisms can enhance our ability to develop 
arguments about temporal processes that are both convincing and have at least limited 
portability.  This brings us to the issue of institutional change.  In historical 
institutionalism there is no clear theory of how and why institutions change, with the 
exception of punctuated equilibrium.  However, ‘the problem with this model is that 
institutions explain everything until they explain nothing’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, 
p. 15).  In stable periods institutions are independent variables used to explain 
outcomes, but during periods of breakdown, following crises, the status of institutions 
is inverted.  They become dependent variables, their design at the mercy of political 
conflicts consequent of the break down. 
In the context of temporality we turn to critical junctures.  Watersheds open 
and close opportunities that shape political life for years thereafter (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967, p. 37).  Periods of institutional genesis correspond to critical junctures 
(Abbott, 1997).  Critical junctures are characterised by the adoption of a particular 
institutional arrangement from among various alternatives (Mahoney, 2000, p. 512).  
Levi (1997) argues that the juncture is critical as once an option is selected it becomes 
progressively more difficulty to return to the initial point when alternatives were 
available. 
Critical junctures establish pathways that funnel units in particular directions, 
the paths spoken of in path dependency.  Once units move in a particular direction 
they realise increasing returns, and continue in that direction (Mahoney, 2003, p. 53).  
This points to the importance of the past to explain the present, and highlights the 
need for a broad historical vantage point.  Moreover, this ‘suggests the importance of 
focusing on the formative moments for institutions and organisations (Pierson, 1993, 
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p. 602).  While not maintaining that critical junctures are the only source of change or 
innovation, critical junctures can discredit existing institutions and policies, triggering 
change (Cortel and Peterson, 1999, p. 184). 
 
 
The Use of the Critical Junctures Approach  
 
Until now the character of critical junctures, and the perspective from which they are 
analysed, has varied greatly.  Some critical junctures may involve considerable 
discretion, whereas others appear embedded in antecedent conditions.  The duration 
of a critical juncture may involve a brief period in which one direction or another is 
taken, or can constitute an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney 2001). 
 The analysis of critical junctures has recently been finding wider employment 
in comparative politics.  Critical junctures have been used to understand the 
trajectories of national development in Latin America (Collier and Collier, 1991).  
Examining the preconditions for institutional reform in Switzerland, Armingeon and 
Beyeler (2001, p. 6)1 refer to critical junctures as windows of opportunity for policy 
makers.  Garrett and Lange (1995, p. 628) argue that electoral landslides create 
critical junctures by producing overwhelming mandates for policy and/or structural 
change.  Garrett (1993, p. 523) writes of this in relation to the emergence of ‘two of 
the most successful instances of structural change in the twentieth century: social 
democracy in Sweden after the Great Depression, and neoliberalism in Thatcher’s 
Britain.’  Casper and Taylor (1996) argue that critical junctures can be used in 
analysing periods when authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to liberalisation.  The 
approach has been utilised in examining watershed in American trade policy 
(Haggard, 1988, p. 91), the political dynamic of the Chiapas conflict (Vargas, 2004), 
and the emergence of occupational welfare in Israeli (Gal and Bargal, 2002).  Karl 
(1997) refers to critical junctures in her analysis of how “petro-states” become locked 
into problematic development paths.  Although the perspective’s importance is 
evident in cross-national studies, it is also useful in research on long-term patterns of 
change within countries (Brady, 1988). 
 Arguments about critical junctures have been important to research on labour 
politics.  Kerr (1960, p. 235) emphasises the long-term stability of the industrial 
relations systems crystallised at relatively early stages.  Valenzuela (1979) shows how 
the filling of organisational space during crucial phases of labour movement 
development freeze organisational alternatives within the labour sector.  Lipset (1983, 
p. 1) analyses how the historic conditions under which the proletariat entered the 
political arena shaped the subsequent emergence of reformist, as opposed to 
revolutionary, labour movements. 
The critical juncture’s approach concentrates on historical causes 
(Stinchcombe, 1968, pp. 101-29).  Here a set of causal factors brings about an 
outcome, or legacy, at a particular point, and the pattern that is instituted reproduces 
itself without recurrence of the original cause.  Central to the process of reproduction 
is that institutions create vested interests, and power holders therein seek to perpetuate 
their own positions (Verba, 1971, p. 308).  This suggests a path dependent pattern of 
change in which outcomes during a crucial transition establish distinct trajectories 
within which one incident follows another (David, 1985, p. 332).   
The traditional understanding of trade union politics, and state-union relations, 
suggests it is an area where a given constellation of political relationships, once 
institutionalised, has a tendency to persist.  This suggests that a critical juncture 
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framework is appropriate in the analysis of trade union politics (Collier and Collier, 
1991, p. 37). 
 
 
Remoulding the Approach 
 
A significant problem is that a set of universally applicable criteria by which to assess 
potential critical junctures to discover if they are critical junctures, or cases of change 
that have taken place incrementally, does not exist.  While acknowledging that the 
development of a set of universally applicable rigorous standards for exploring critical 
junctures would be near impossible, in light of the vast milieu of topics under 
examination in political science, at least moving in that direction would constitute an 
advance for the discipline.  Thus, we are left wrestling with contradictory necessities, 
the need to be more rigorous – to advance the approach, and the requirement to be 
broadly applicable, if the approach is to be of use to the discipline as a whole.  
Consequently, the standards developed have to be broad and encompassing.    
The paper seeks to improve our understanding of the concept of critical 
junctures, and political change.  It seeks to ‘flesh out the often-invoked but rarely 
examined declaration that history matters’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 2).  The paper argues 
that the critical junctures concept, as it has developed, lacks rigour.  Improving upon 
the approach will involve specifying clearly defined standards that enable the 
identification of levels of change in order to see whether or not a specific period of 
change constitutes a critical juncture.  These standards will make the approach 
operationalisable and falsifiable.  What is more, this focus on the temporal dimension 
provides possibilities for shaping some common or overlapping intellectual terrain for 
scholars working in diverse research traditions (Pierson, 2004 p. 8). 
 The idea of critical junctures is endowed with the richness of the observation 
that history matters.  The analysis of what Pierson (2004, p. 77) calls ‘temporal 
ordering’ is central to the claim that history matters.  But, even though analysts 
increasingly invoke the concept of path dependence, clear definitions are rare.  This is 
where clarity in regard to the progenitors of paths in path dependency, the critical 
junctures, becomes important.  At least if we are clear about the beginnings this 
should help us in later efforts to clarify wider definitions encompassing path 
dependency.  In relation to the causal chain arguments, and the infinite regress 
problem, a clear understanding of a critical juncture would provide us with a clear 
break in the chain with which to define the starting point for our analysis.  As 
Mahoney (2001, p. 8) puts it, ‘critical junctures provide a basis for cutting into the 
seamless flow of history.’ 
In 1991 Collier and Collier set out a generalised framework for analysing 
change, this to determine if certain changes constituted critical junctures.  In 2001 
Mahoney, utilising the Collier’s framework, sought to explain why the different 
experiences of the nineteenth century liberal period in five Central American 
countries constituted key critical junctures in their histories.  However, there was no 
systematic approach, or rigorous framework, for determining when change was 
sufficient to constitute a critical juncture.  Consequently, a question that arises is how 
to distinguish between a critical juncture, and incremental change that is relatively 
swift?  Thus, while answering the question may place restrictions on the liberty with 
which the term is used, at least now one will be able to say with greater certainty what 
is a critical juncture. 
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To be able to recognise what is a critical juncture, we must be able to 
recognise what is not.  Not all events, even seemingly significant events, can be 
critical junctures.  A critical juncture must be an event that puts our chosen unit, or 
units, of examination onto particular paths to development.  Prior to the critical 
juncture, a range of possibilities must exist for those units, afterwards these 
possibilities will have mostly vanished, replaced by a particular enduring legacy.  It is 
here at the narrowing point, where possibilities close off, that we must seek a means 
of defining critical junctures. 
We argue that two separate elements are required for a critical juncture.  
Firstly, it is necessary to identify the generative cleavage.  This will involve an 
examination of the tensions that lead to the period of change.  Secondly, for the 
change that takes place to constitute a critical juncture, as opposed to an incremental 
change, this change must be significant, swift, and have an enduring legacy (see 
Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1: CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
[Generative Cleavage]  + [Change] = [Critical Juncture] 
 (Significant; Swift; Enduring)  
 
 
The literature on critical junctures views them from the perspective of 
cleavages, placing emphasis on the tensions that lead up to the critical juncture.  Since 
these cleavages are seen as producing the critical juncture Valenzeula and Valenzuela 
(1981, p. 15) refer to them as generative cleavages.  The generative cleavage to be 
examined will depend on the topic studied.  ‘Traditionally, students of institutional 
change focused on the importance of situations of large-scale public dissatisfaction, or 
even fear, stemming from an unusual degree of social unrest and/or threats to national 
security’ (Cortell and Peterson, 1999, p. 184).  Wars, revolutions, economic crises, 
changing balance of power, electoral landslides, and social movements may produce 
an overwhelming mandate for policy and or/structural change (Cortell and Peterson, 
1999, p. 184).  Such events discredit existing institutions and policies, triggering 
change (Tilly, 1975).  As Katznelson (1997) states, the macro analysis of critical 
junctures that set countries along different developmental paths has been the bread 
and butter of historical institutionalism.  However, critical junctures need not be 
attributed only to big exogenous shocks.  Many, less dramatic, events could be found 
to constitute generative cleavages, contributing to change that is significant, swift and 
enduring.  Within the framework set out here all that is necessary to test a case is a 
detailed examination of the evidence to see if it fits with the criterion for a critical 
juncture. 
The issue of what constitutes significant change will vary as a function of the 
topic studied.  But, instead of arguing, as in the past, that change must be significant, 
and saying no more on this matter, here we lay down standards for identifying the 
level of significance of change.  These standards are to be measured qualitatively and 
quantitatively.  Change of below a specified point is not classified as significant, 
while above a certain point the significance of the change is considered to increase 
through various levels – low, medium, and high.  At a high level of significance the 
change would be considered noteworthy.  Consequently, our search for critical 
junctures is not confined to large world-shattering events, but can refer to relatively 
small events, that if they occur at the right moment, can have large and enduring 
consequences. 
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Because we are dealing with critical junctures, periods of significant change, 
we assume the change is not long and drawn out.  We must reject the notion of 
incremental change if dealing with radical change at a point in time.  Consequently, 
we add the notion of swiftness to our understanding of a critical juncture.  The 
significant change must be quick.  In the case below a swift change is taken to be one 
that occurs within twelve months.  Ultimately, decisions as to swiftness will depend 
on the topic, and will, in all probability, be arbitrary.  Nevertheless, the chosen 
standard for swiftness, having been set out, will have to be applied equally across all 
cases examined in the study, adding consistency to the examination of potential 
critical junctures.  Then, at least, a standard will have been established to work with in 
the testing of cases. 
If, as is frequently claimed in social analysis, outcomes at a critical juncture 
induce a path dependent process with increasing returns resulting, we shall keep the 
concept of a legacy resulting from a critical juncture.  Collier and Collier (1991, p. 33) 
do not provide any criteria for minimum legacy duration.  However, instead of just a 
vague notion that a critical juncture must have enduring after-effects, we assumed that 
for a change to be a critical juncture its after-effects should last for a minimum of at 
least one standard government’s term of office.  Although arbitrary, this is still 
specific to the topic under examination, and to an extent arbitrary measures are 
necessary when attempting to quantify that which has never been quantified 
previously.  As King et al., (1994, p. 152) state in relation to social science research, 
‘a universally right answer does not exist: all measurement depends on the problem 
that the investigator seeks to understand.’  While not setting a specific end point for 
the duration of a critical juncture’s legacy, at least setting a minimum for its duration 
makes it easier to identify a critical juncture when examining change.  Should the 
critical juncture have no legacy – then it was not a critical juncture.  In other words, a 
particular and irreversible path was not laid down at the time of interest. 
It is only through the examination of its historical legacy that the importance 
of a critical juncture can be established.  Many social processes take a long time.  
Recognition of this fact is restricted in political science, with so much research 
focused on the immediate (Pierson, 2004, pp. 79-81).  This is one of the benefits of 
the approach set out. 
This definition of a critical juncture gives rise to four possible findings, as set 
out in the diagram (see Figure 2).  It is only in the top left hand box that a critical 
juncture can be identified.  In any of the other three locations the conditions for a 
critical juncture are not met.  This diagram will be used here to illustrate the results of 
the various findings uncovered. 
 
FIGURE 2: THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE GRID 
Generative Cleavage 
(Crisis) 
Change (Significant, Swift, and Enduring) 
 YES NO 
YES  GC + SSE = CJ 
 
GC + No SSE = No CJ 
 
 
NO No GC + SSE = No CJ 
 
No GC + No SSE = No CJ 
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The remoulded critical juncture framework improves our ability to identify 
change.  A common framework for analysing critical junctures is vital, as without it 
the validity of findings are questionable.  The starting point for all path dependency 
arguments is weakened without a definitive answer as to whether there is a critical 
juncture at the initial branching point.  The objective in setting the various criteria for 
assessment is to rigorously systemise the critical junctures approach.  The use of this 
approach will enable the identification of what is, and what is not, a critical juncture.  
This addresses the uncertainties regarding critical junctures not answered by earlier 
approaches.  The remoulded critical junctures approach ads an analytical tool to the 
historical institutional toolkit, allowing for a more coherent researching and 
understanding of past events. 
To sum up, the argument in relation to critical junctures is that there must be a 
generative cleavage, along with a period of change that is significant, swift, and 
enduring.  Should any of these conditions not be fulfilled then there was no critical 
juncture.  This clarity in identifying what is a critical juncture is the approach’s 
strength.  This provides historical institutionalists with a useful tool in exploring and 
quantifying change.  Ambiguity concerning the concept of critical junctures is 
removed. 
While not purporting to have drawn up a panacea to the problem of identifying 
when a period of change is a critical juncture, this framework contributes towards 
answering that question in a way that is applicable across disciplines.  This is the 
strength of the approach set out here.  When employed in conjunction with narrative, 
analytical, and counterfactual analysis, the remoulded critical junctures approach can 
help the investigator identify what Aminzade (1992, p. 463) calls the “key choice 
points” the forks in the road.   
 
 
 METHODOLOGY  
 
The Choice of Trade Unions 
 
Institutions range from formal government structures, through legal institutions, to 
more amorphous social institutions.  ‘Just where to draw the line on what counts as an 
institution is a matter of controversy’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2).  Included in 
their definition of institutions are such features of the institutional context as the 
structure and organisation of economic actors like trade unions. 
 Trade union peak organisations are interest groups active within the polity.  
The state actors and societal actors with whom the union peak organisations interact 
all operate inside the national institutional framework.  For Steinmo (1989, pp. 503-
504) these frameworks are the context in which groups and individuals interpret their 
self-interest and thereby define their policy preferences.  In this approach the trade 
union centres behave like any rational political actor, defining their policy preference 
and strategic objectives within the framework of the country’s decision-making 
institutions. 
Trade unions are usually the largest sectional interest groups in western 
societies.  The influence of trade union peak organisations over public policy provides 
an arena in which to examine broad comparative questions.  The power of trade 
unions is a central tenet in the ideological debate between left and right in various 
countries.  The level of influence they wield within a polity can affect the formulation 
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of economic and social policies, the distribution of wealth across the society, 
industrial relations policy, and the use and misuse of human resources. 
The case study focuses on the changing influence of the ICTU over Irish 
public policy in 1959.  This case study was chosen from a methodological viewpoint.  
This period was identified, after a preliminary examination, as constituting a good test 
case for the remoulded critical junctures approach, and its dependent variable.  It 
appears that the ICTU’s influence over Irish public policy increased dramatically in 
that year, and that this increased influence endured thereafter.  This suggests at a 
critical juncture, and a consequential developmental path. 
In political science, while we should not generalize from single cases, a single-
case design is appropriate when that case represents an example for testing a theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; see also Yin, 1994).  Overall, the Irish trade union movement did 
well in the period 1959-1981.  If this success can be called path dependent, did it stem 
from an identifiable critical juncture?  The remoulded approach should be able to 
provide an answer. 
  
 
The Choice of Generative Cleavage  
 
Macroeconomic crises were chosen as the proxy for the generative cleavages, as they 
impact significantly upon both trade unions, and their peak organisations.  As Collier 
and Collier (1991, p. 93) point out, labour movements and national economies are 
linked to one another, their roots, and evolutions, intertwined.  ‘Most scholars agree 
that severe recessions make significant structural changes possible because they 
render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett, 1993, p. 522).  The trade unions are exposed to 
the impact of economic fluctuations as their membership makes up the workforce of 
an economy, and they themselves are interest groups active within that political 
economy.  This places an emphasis on the importance of the economic situation 
leading up to a critical juncture.  However, this leaves us with a degree of subjectivity 
as to what constitutes a macroeconomic crisis. 
However, it should be noted that there is the possibility that a generative 
cleavage other than a macroeconomic crisis could coincide with significant, swift, and 
enduring change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy.  Although 
employed here, macroeconomic crises are only one of any number of other proxies (as 
discussed above) that could be utilised for generative cleavages, provided adequately 
justified.   
 
 
Time Frame 
 
This paper will focus on change in trade unions’ influence over public policy in 
Ireland in 1959.  That year is noted by scholars as marking an important turning point 
for modern Ireland.  The 1940s had been a decade of economic stagnation, but the late 
1950s witnessed a revival.  There was a shift in economic policy from protectionism 
to openness at the time when Sean Lemass became Taoiseach.  If any period marked a 
significant turning point in the political economic history of Ireland 1959 would be a 
prime example.  The change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy may have 
constituted a critical juncture, as its contribution to national public policy making was 
dramatically enhanced thereafter.  The case study will be examined using the criteria 
set out above in the remoulded critical junctures framework.  The search for these 
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criteria will enable us to determine whether or not we are dealing with a critical 
juncture. 
 
 
Hypotheses and Observable Implications 
 
In the context a trade union peak organisation as the case study, we must determine 
hypotheses that can used to test the remoulded critical junctures approach.  The 
assumptions that for a critical juncture there must be a generative cleavage, and a 
coinciding period of change that is significant, swift and enduring, are used to derive 
the hypotheses and observable implications that are testable against empirical 
evidence. 
 The hypotheses are structured to correspond with the framework developed for 
examining critical junctures.  The first hypothesis examines whether there was a 
generative cleavage at the time focused upon.  The second hypothesis deals with the 
issue of change in trade union peak organisation influence over public policy.  This 
encompasses the criteria of significant, swift, and enduring, change. 
It must be recognised that when dealing with multivariate analyses based upon 
the qualitative examination of historical events we come up against the issue of 
assessing partial explanations.  This realisation permits us to approach the search for, 
and utilisation of, empirical data with an understanding that the empirical-theoretical 
fit will vary between each observable implication, and between each hypotheses.  To 
identify the extent of this variation it is necessary to classify the empirical-theoretical 
fit according to a scale running from none, through low and medium, to high.  The 
findings will be set out in a table to see if the proposed critical juncture constituted a 
critical juncture. 
 
H1. If there was a critical juncture, then there must have been a generative 
cleavage (macroeconomic crisis). 
 
Economic Data 
1. If the country’s main economic indicators have reached decade-long lows, then 
the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
One indicator at a decade-long low – no empirical-theoretical fit, two indicators – low 
empirical-theoretical fit, three indicators – medium empirical-theoretical fit, four 
indicators – high fit. 
 
Economic Opinions and Assessments  
2. If the media regard the economy as in crisis, there may have been a crisis. 
 
3. If economic and political commentators regard the economy as in crisis, there may 
have been a crisis. 
 
4. If the central bank regards the economy as in crisis, there may have been a crisis. 
 
5. If the OECD regards the economy as in crisis, there may have been a crisis. 
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If the above regard the economy as in crisis there is high empirical-theoretical fit, 
anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower depending on 
their assessment of the situation 
 
Elected Representatives 
6. If elected representatives regard the economy as in crisis, there may have been a 
crisis. 
 
7. If government pronouncements on the economy are consistent with a crisis 
management approach, then may have been a crisis. 
 
If the above regard economy as in crisis there is high empirical-theoretical fit, 
anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower depends on their 
assessment of the situation. 
 
H2. If there was a critical juncture, then change in trade union peak organisation 
influence over public policy must have been significant, swift, and enduring. 
 
This analysis will search for changes in the trade union peak organisations’ policy 
preferences and relative power over public policy.  This approach is not measuring the 
trade unions’ influence per se, but looking for indicators of change in the relationship 
between the union peak organisation and government.  The observable implications, 
sub-divided amongst the headings of access and attitudes, structures, government 
policies and trade union policies, and third party assessments of government – trade 
union relations are comprehensive.  The independent variables were chosen to 
identify significant, swift, and enduring change in the relationship between the trade 
union peak organisation and government. 
 In classifying the empirical-theoretical fit according to a scale running from 
none, through low and medium, to high, the specific criteria shall be whether each of 
the observable implications underwent significant, swift, and enduring change.  As set 
out above, swift refers to change taking place within months of the proposed critical 
juncture, while enduring requires that the critical juncture’s after effects last for 
longer than a standard administration’s term of office. 
However, significance shall be the most important factor searched for, as 
without significant change there is little to indicate a critical juncture.  The criteria for 
significance, being particular to each observable implication, will be set out 
individually.  Should none of these criteria (significant, swift, and enduring) be found, 
then the empirical-theoretical fit for that observable will be none.  Should one of these 
criteria be uncovered the empirical-theoretical fit for that observable implication will 
be low.  If two of the criteria are found then the empirical-theoretical fit will be 
medium.  Should all three of the criteria be found then the empirical-theoretical fit for 
that observable will be high. 
 
Access and Attitudes 
1. If the unions’ rate of meetings with the prime minister changed significantly, 
swiftly, and enduringly, then the unions’ influence over public policy may have 
changed. 
 
Change of below 10 per cent - no significance, between 11 and 25 per cent - low, 
between 26 and 50 per cent - medium, and above 50 per cent high significance. 
 12
 
2. If ministerial attitudes towards the unions’ underwent significant, swift, and 
enduring change then the unions’ influence over policy may have changed. 
 
The identification of significance shall depend on the nature of ministerial statements. 
 
Structures 
3. If union representation on government committees underwent significant, swift, 
and enduring change then the unions’ influence over public policy may have 
changed. 
 
Change below 10 per cent – no significance, between 11 and 25 per cent – low, 
between 26 and 50 per cent – medium, and above 50 per cent – high. 
 
4. If the relationship between the unions, employers’ peak organisation, and/or 
government, measured by economic partnership agreements, changed 
significantly, swiftly, and enduringly the trade unions’ influence over public 
policy may have changed. 
 
No change in relationship – no significance.  Institution/dissolution of informal 
agreement between two parties – low, institution/dissolution of informal agreement 
between three parties – medium, and institution/dissolution of a formal agreement 
between two/three parties – high significance. 
 
5. If union membership underwent significant, swift, and enduring change then the 
unions’ influence over public policy may have changed. 
 
Change below 1 per cent – no significance, between 1 and 2 per cent – low, between 2 
to 3 per cent – medium, and above 3 per cent – high significance. 
 
Government Policies and Trade Union Policies 
6. If government policies towards labour, measured by statements, manifestos, 
coalition agreement, policy documents, and budgetary statements changed 
significantly, swiftly, and enduringly then the unions’ influence on public policy 
may have changed. 
 
Identification of significance shall be subjective, focusing on the qualitative aspect of 
government policies toward the unions. 
 
7. If trade union policies incorporated into government’s policies towards organised 
labour, measured by comparison of union policy documents with government 
policy documents, changed significantly, swiftly, and enduringly then the unions’ 
influence over public policy may have changed. 
 
Identification of significance will be subjective, depending upon the unions’ 
judgement. 
 
Third Party Assessments of Government – Trade Union Relations 
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8. If government’s economic policies, as identified by organisations monitoring 
economic performance, underwent significant, swift, and enduring change then 
the unions’ influence over public policy may have changed. 
 
Identification of significance shall depend on the judgement of the organisations 
monitoring economic performance. 
 
9. If union involvement in public policy, identified by national economic, political, 
and industrial relations commentators, changed significantly, swiftly, and 
enduringly then the unions’ influence over public policy may have changed. 
 
Identification of significance will depend upon the judgement of the commentators. 
 
If drastic, swift, and enduring change in the unions’ influence over public policy were 
recorded at the time of a macroeconomic crisis then a critical juncture has been 
uncovered.  However, there will be variations in the level of empirical-theoretical fit 
for each of the hypotheses’ observable implications.  This raises the question of how 
many observables should point to an empirical-theoretical fit, and at what level they 
should point to this fit, to indicate a critical juncture.  This is a subjective decision.  
Statisticians suggest that over 30 percent of observables at a high level of fit is a good 
result.  However, we prefer to set a higher standard as many of our measures are 
subjective in nature.  Here, a rule of 66 per cent is adopted.  At least two thirds of all 
observable implications, for which there are findings, should point to high empirical-
theoretical fit for there to have been a critical juncture. 
 
 
Proposed Critical Juncture: Ireland 1959 
 
H1. The State of the Economy 
 
Economic Indicators 
 
The 1950s were a depressed era for Ireland.  The Economist points out that most 
indicators of economic performance were poor (EIU, 1992, p. 5).  The benefits from 
protectionism had been reaped by the industrial expansion of the 1930s.  By the 1950s 
Irish industry was supplying as much of the domestic market as it could.  The 
economic indicators examined here are unemployment, inflation, debt/GNP, GDP 
growth, days lost to industrial disputes, and economic openness.  As Appendix A 
shows, only two of these six indicators were at decade long lows in 1959, these were 
Debt/GNP, and economic openness.  For the other 4 indicators their low points had 
passed during the 1950s.  Nevertheless, none of these indicators could in anyway be 
called impressive, all pointing to the dire economic situation in the country. 
 As can be seen, all economic indicators improved consistently after 1959.  
Unemployment fell to roughly its natural level, inflation remained in single figures, 
debt stabilised to a large extent, and growth increase, while the number of days lost to 
industrial disputes fluctuated and economic openness increase. 
 
 
Economic Opinions and Assessments  
 
 14
The national and international media held negative views on the Irish economy.  The 
Sunday Press argued that the second coalition government was defeated in 1957 by 
Fianna Fáil due to the general economic collapse, and a lack of will to tackle the 
problems at its heart.2  The Irish Times observed that employment was declining, 
unemployment increasing, hundreds of thousands emigrating, and the cost of living 
increasing.3  From abroad, The Economist pointed out that political matters, such as 
the voting system, were receiving Taoiseach de Valera’s attention at the expense of 
the economy.  The paper argued that ‘righting the economy would be the paramount 
task facing the new Irish Taoiseach, Seán Lemass.’4  The Irish Independent had little 
positive to say about the economy, alluding instead to the hope that with a new 
Taoiseach things might improve.5  Time International remarked that there had been 
few economic advances in Ireland during the 1950s, and that 40,000 of Ireland’s most 
energetic young people were leaving annually.6   
From the late 1940s onwards the Irish economy stagnated (Hillery, 1980, p. 
46).  ‘By the middle of the 1950s a serious crisis of confidence had developed, caused 
by widespread anxiety that the performance of the economy was so poor the country 
was falling behind Western European standards, not only in productivity, but in the 
social benefits that productivity might be expected to confer (Lyons, 1973, p. 618).  
By the time De Valera returned to office in 1957 the economy had plumbed the 
depths of hopelessness (Whitaker, 1973, p. 415).  ‘In the 1950s, Ireland’s relative 
[economic] performance was disastrous, poorer than that of the UK as well as the 
European average’ (Gráda and O’Rourke, 1995, p. 214).  Between 1951 and 1958 
GDP rose by less than 1 per cent per year, employment declined by 12 per cent, 
unemployment rose, and half a million emigrated.  The benefits from protectionism 
had been reaped by the industrial expansion of the 1930s (Haughton, 1995).  Stop-go 
policies, in which an adverse balance of payments signalled that drastic fiscal actions 
were to follow, produced severe and largely unnecessary fiscal contractions in 1952 
and 1957 (Kennedy and Dowling, 1975).  In the late 1950s, the outlook for the 
economy was depressing, while the economies of Europe achieved strong and 
sustained growth (MacSharry and White, 2001, pp. 14-19).  The delay in coming to 
terms with the failure of protectionism gave Ireland the status of a late starter 
(O’Malley, 1989).  It was this mood of despair over the economy that permitted 
Lemass to subsequently slaughter a list of sacred political cows (Lee, 1989, p. 341). 
By the late 1950s the Central Bank was expressing grave concerns about the 
economy.  It agued that there was ‘evidence of undue concentration, not only of 
financial resources, but of thought, energy, and administrative ability, on projects of 
questionable economic value.’7  In a damning indictment of the economic situation, it 
stated that ‘a study of events during the past ten years, of the courses that have been 
pursued, and of their consequences, is a necessary preliminary to the formulation of 
any sound proposals for the improvement of the national economy.’8  The Central 
Bank also observed that ‘the present economic and financial situation scarcely 
justifies the retention of confidence in large-scale expenditure on public works and 
social amenities as a means of stimulating useful economic activity and a progressive 
increase in real national income.9  It also pointed to the large external trade deficit.10  
There had been an excess of imports over exports during the latter years of the 
decade.11  The Central Bank argued that a greater proportion of expenditure than 
could be afforded had been devoted to social purposes, while too little had been set-
aside for the future in the shape of protective investment.12  ‘The total estimated 
numbers at work declined from 1956 through 1959.13  Despite the intensive 
development of sheltered industries catering for the home market, a high level of 
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social investment, and large-scale external disinvestments and external borrowing, the 
problems of unemployment and emigration remained.14  In 1961 the Central Bank 
remarked that the 1950s had been a decade of economic stagnation.15   
The OECD (1957, p. 11) observed that the condition of the Irish economy was 
not satisfactory.  Between 1955 and 1958 the economy was affected by the restrictive 
measures adopted in 1955 to correct for a balance of payments deficit (OECD, 1964, 
p. 5).  Consequently, gross national product declined.  The numbers employed in 
manufacturing industry were no higher in 1958 than in 1951.  The OECD (1961, p. 5) 
argued that the 1950s had been a time of terrible economic depression.  Economic 
analysis of the country’s performance showed agricultural production abnormally 
low, and industrial output faltering (OECD’s, 1961, p. 8).  The following year the 
OECD (1962, p. 5) commented that most of the post-war period was marked by slow 
and unbalanced growth in Ireland.  The OECD (1962, p. 6) went on to state that per 
capita GNP grew at a rate of 2.4 per cent throughout the 1950s, but only because of 
‘the exceptional demographic experience during this period when net migration 
averaged forty-one thousand persons a year.’  This per capita growth rate was among 
the lowest in the OECD (OECD, 1962, p. 6). 
 
 
Elected Representatives  
 
Government and opposition deputies recognized the economic crisis facing the 
country.  ‘They realised that the Irish economy could not survive in isolation’ 
(Murphy, 1997, p. 57).  Dr Donovan, in the Senate, warned of the trade deficit, 
national debt, stationary national income, and falling population.  He stated that the 
fascination with equilibrium economics was insufficient for progress.16  Patrick 
Lindsey, in the Dail, stated it was a critical time for the economy.17  Tánaiste 
MacEntee argued that Ireland would have to face up to its economic difficulties if it 
was to maintain its status as a sovereign state.18  Opposition deputies accused the 
government of neglecting agriculture while sponsoring an ineffective industrial 
expansion.19  Daniel Desmond of Labour argued that it was time for the political 
establishment to realise that solving the problems with the economy superseded their 
power struggles.20  General Mulcahy, leader of Fine Gael, remarked that a tremendous 
effort would be required by all sections of the community to right the economy.21 
Lemass remarked that the task for the generation of the 1950s was to 
consolidate the economic foundations of independence, and that 1959 was a crucial 
year for economic security.22  ‘We have got to demonstrate beyond question the 
capacity to develop a viable economy.’23  The problem was that economic activity 
was not high enough to ensure good living standards for all.24  In late 1959 Lemass 
remarked that he, and the government, were ready to support any scheme of economic 
merit.25  He said the government would not minimise the magnitude of the tasks 
facing the country, or the distance it was from realising it economic objectives.  There 
was also the need to prepare the economy for the danger of balance of payments 
deficit, restrain consumer spending,26 and for measures to increase employment, and 
reduce emigration, both of which were very serious.  Lemass commented that in the 
context of the economic problems the government was contending with the 
publication of the Programme for Economic Expansion indicated its conclusion that 
the measures previous undertaken were insufficient.27 
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H2. Change in Union Influence over Public Policy 
 
Access and Attitudes 
 
When Lemass became Taoiseach he brought to government a vigorous 
entrepreneurial leadership (McCarthy, 1973, p. 22).  A new approach was adopted 
towards both the economy and trade unions.  Lemass ‘was prepared to offer the trade 
union movement an integral part in the development of much of the new thinking that 
lay behind the government’s economic and social programme’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 
32). 
‘In February 1959 the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) was formally 
inaugurated’ (Nevin, 1994, p. 96).  Union unity gave the Taoiseach an opportunity to 
embark on national bargaining on wages policy, as there now existed a chance that the 
unions and employers could be brought together in a new framework that could 
achieve industrial progress without disputes (Horgan, 1997, p. 190). 
‘Shortly after Lemass became Taoiseach, he invited Congress to meet him to 
discuss the question of development’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 125).  Whereas the ICTU had 
only one meeting with Taoiseach de Valera in 1958,28 it met with Lemass three times 
in 1959, and again in 1960.29  The years thereafter saw more meetings, these focusing 
on a range of issues encompassing the economy and Ireland’s policies towards the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  This was in line with the call for more joint 
consultation between State, union, and employers in the First Programme for 
Economic Expansion.  Lemass’s speeches in 1959 often paralleled the positions 
adopted by Congress (Girvin, 1994, p. 125).  These included the need for state 
involvement in development, and the expansion of the state sector.30 
 
 
Structures 
 
There was change in the unions’ representation on government committees.  
Appendix B shows that ICTU representation on industrial relations committees 
increased by 50 per cent, while representation on economic and social committees 
rose by 160 per cent.  With the move towards the liberalisation of trade, and economic 
planning, Lemass was instrumental in the creation of consultative bodies involving 
the unions and employers (Lee, 1989, p. 401).  This provided the ICTU with more 
avenues through which to influence public policy.  Joint consultation was seen as 
extremely important for economic development (NIEC, 1966).  Some of the new 
bodies the ICTU was represented upon included the Irish National Productivity 
Committee (INPC), a consultative body charged with improving industrial 
productivity.31  The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO), set up to examine 
the ability of Irish industry to compete within the EEC (Murphy, 1997, p. 62).  The 
National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC), established in 1963 as the main 
consultative body in economic planning.32  ‘It was composed of members nominated 
by the Government, the ICTU and the FUE, state boards, and the FII’ (Meenan, 1970, 
p. 157).  These bodies, ‘[paralleling] the state’s commitment to economic planning as 
contained in the first two programmes for economic expansion’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 127) 
permitted the unions to co-operate with the state on a range of problems posed by 
economic expansion.  ‘A new pattern of participation by Congress in government 
institutions emerged between 1959 and 1965’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 127). 
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 Consultative bodies, and joint consultation, gave the unions a new perception 
of their strength.  ‘The institutional setting soon became largely tripartite, with the 
representatives of business, of labour and of government discussing employment, 
output, prices and trade’ (Pratschke, 1979, p. 43).  ‘From the countless tripartite 
meetings of these bodies, trade unionism was drawn inexorably into the framing of 
social and economic policies (Lynch, 1994, p. 169).  Lynch argues that this later led 
to the National Pay Agreements, National Understandings, and the Programme for 
National Recovery.  This shows that the government’s policies towards organised 
labour underwent drastic change after 1959. 
The declining union membership was arrested in 1959 (Appendix C).  
Between 1955 and 1958 trade union membership decreased by 9,600, falling to 
306,800 in 1958.  However, in 1959 membership increased by 6,900, or 2.2 per cent, 
to 313,700.  In 1960 trade union membership increased again, by 3.8 per cent.  Within 
five years of the proposed critical juncture there were upwards of 50,000 new 
members in Irish trade unions, an increase of 16 per cent.  After 1959 trade union 
membership increased for the following 21 years. 
 
 
Government Policies and Trade Union Policies 
 
The protectionist policies that had been continued after the war were reinforced 
during the 1950s (Girvin, 1994, p. 124).  The late 1950s saw economic policy, as 
influenced by Secretary of the Department of Finance T K Whitaker’s report 
Economic Development, shift from protectionism to export led industrialisation 
(Fitzpatrick and Kelly, 1985, p. xviii).  ‘Sooner or later, protectionism will have to go 
and the challenge of free trade accepted’ (Department of Finance, 1958, p. 2).  This 
constituted an admission of the failure of the economic philosophy underlying 
protectionism (O’Connell and Rottman, 1994, p. 234).  Whitaker advanced a three-
pronged strategy for recovery: more planning, fewer tariff barriers, and greater 
emphasis on productive investment.  ‘Thus it was in the atmosphere of a new 
government and a more active and interventionist Department of Finance, that 
Economic Development was born’ (Murphy, 2003, p. 61).  ‘In 1958 a symbolic, but 
nevertheless significant, act was the abolishing of the 1932 Control of Manufacturers 
Act which, was designed to keep industry in Irish hands’ (Munck, 1993, p. 33).   
Economic Development is regarded as ‘a watershed in the modern economic 
history of the country’ (Lyons, 1973, p. 628).  It proposed opening the economy with 
the gradual transition to free trade, stimulation of private investment, the reorientation 
of government investment towards more productive uses, the introduction of grants 
and tax concessions to encourage export orientated manufacturing, and the 
inducement of direct investment by foreign export oriented manufacturers.33  The 
document advocated the abandonment of protectionism.34  These measures were 
incorporated into the First Programme for Economic Expansion in November 1958.  
The passing of the Industrial Development Act 1959 removed restrictions on foreign 
ownership of capital in Ireland.  Speaking in the Dail in June 1959 Leamss remarked, 
on economic protectionism, that ‘there is need now to raise our targets and, I believe, 
also change our methods.’35  He ‘had been convinced since 1958 of the inevitability 
of free trade’ (Whitaker, 1973, p. 418).  The Central Bank observed that ‘it is, of 
course, because of the continuing need for the promotion of increased productive 
activity at home that the redefinition of the objectives of economic policy represented 
by the government’s statement was so necessary and is of so much importance.’36 
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There was change in the government’s policies toward trade unions.  Lemass’s 
perspective on economic development was close to the ICTU’s.  In June 1959 Lemass 
remarked on the need for change in industrial development policy.37  He realised that 
government policy towards labour would have to change.  ‘The government began to 
look hopefully to the united Congress for support in its programme of national 
development’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32).  Adjusting industries to competition led public 
policy into the realms of labour practices, industrial relations, and pay bargaining.  
Lemass was prepared to offer the union movement an integral part in the development 
of the government’s economic and social programme (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32).  
Moreover, government set out policy objectives in the area of employment similar to 
those of Congress (Girvin, 1994, p. 125).  This gave to unions a new perception of 
their strength. 
By 1960 budgets had expanded38 with increased investment in areas identified 
by Congress in policy documents and its private research.39  For the OECD (1961, p. 
12) the Fianna Fail government’s 1958 and 1959 budgets reflected a change in fiscal 
policy.  In the subsequent capital budgets, investments that made no direct 
contribution to productive equipment were reduced.  The OECD (1961, p. 10) found 
that encouragement to industry through grants and tax exemptions attracted foreign 
capital to Ireland.  The government also pursued an increasingly liberal trade policy 
(OECD, 1962, p. 12). 
 
 
Third Party Assessments of Government – Trade Union Relations 
 
Until the late 1950s the unions’ influence in Ireland was mainly indirect (Allen, 1997, 
p. 181).  However, at that time government’s policies towards organised labour began 
to reflect the policies advocated by the unions.  The ICTU Executive Council made 
representations to the Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1959 on legislation 
concerning annual leave with full pay, and minimum conditions of employment 
relating to holidays, overtime, and hours of work.40  The unions’ views on company 
accounts influenced the Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1959.  The 
recommendations of the Company Law Reform Committee, where the ICTU was 
represented, resulted in amendments to company law.41  In early 1960 the ICTU 
requesting an increase in pensions, and other social welfare benefit, to maintain their 
relationship with workers’ wages.42  The subsequent budget increased social 
assistance benefits.43  In 1961 the ICTU and the Federated Union of Employers (FUE) 
reached agreement on the formation of the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC) that 
the government subsequently facilitated.44  This body, established in 1962, became 
central to corporate control (Lalor, 1982, p. 80).  The budget of 1961 saw increases in 
social welfare payments45 in line with the recommendations of the ICTU’s Social 
Welfare Committee.46  The union movement played a major part in the economic and 
social transformation that was coming (Nevin, 1994, p. 97).  ‘From the 1960s 
onwards, Congress pioneered the adoption of social policies now taken for granted’ 
(Lynch, 1994, p. 169)  
Lemass’s realised that government policy towards organised labour would 
have to change.  ‘The government began to look hopefully to the united Congress for 
support in its programme of national development’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32).  The task 
of adjusting Irish industries to competition led public policy into the realms of labour 
practices, industrial relations, and pay bargaining.  This gave to unions a new 
perception of the strength they possessed.  Lemass realised that the success of 
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government strategy assumed a new partnership with different interest groups, which 
would (in time) become players in the policy game (Murphy, 1997, p. 58).   
 
Table 1 shows that 75 per cent of the observable implications for the first 
hypothesis indicated a high fit, pointing to a macroeconomic crisis.  For the second 
hypothesis 70 percent of the observables pointed to high empirical-theoretical fit, 
indicating significant, swift, and enduring change in the unions’ influence over public 
policy.  This confirmed there was a critical juncture in the ICTU’s influence over 
public policy in 1959. 
 
Table 1: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1959 
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1 High Medium Low None 
O1: Are the country’s main economic 
indicators at decade-long lows? 
  X  
O2: Do opinion polls find that the public 
regards the economic state of the country as in 
crisis? 
   X 
O3: Do the national media regard the economic 
state of the country as in crisis? 
X    
O4: Do national economic and political 
commentators regard the economic state of the 
country as in crisis? 
X    
O5: Does the central bank regards the 
economic state of the country as in crisis? 
X    
O6: Do domestic and international organisations 
regard the economic state of the country as in crisis? 
X    
O7: Do elected representatives regard the 
economic state of the country as in crisis? 
X    
O8: Are government pronouncements on the 
state of the economy consistent with a crisis-
management approach? 
X    
     
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2 High Medium Low None 
O1: Change in the trade unions’ access to the 
prime minister 
X    
O2: Change in the trade union representation 
on government committees 
X    
O3: Change in the relationship in the economy 
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak 
organisation, and/or the government 
 X   
O4: Change in the trade unions’ relationship 
with a political party 
   X 
O5: Change in the level of trade union 
membership in the economy 
 X   
O6: Change in the government’s policies 
towards organised labour 
X    
O7: Change in the level of trade union policies 
that were incorporated into the government’s 
policies towards organised labour 
X    
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O8: Change in the government’s economic 
policies 
X    
O9: Change in the trade unions’ influence over 
public policy as identified by national 
economic, political, and industrial relations 
commentators alike 
X    
O10: Change in ministerial attitudes towards 
the role of trade unions in the polity 
X    
 
Conclusion 
 
Historical institutionalism explores the conditions under which institutions have 
consequences.  The most successful aspect of this literature is the understanding it has 
provided of policy continuities within countries, and variations across countries.  
However, this approach treats institutions as static variables.  Consequently, it 
provides accounts that fail to capture the essence of change. 
In political science there are few tools with which to make sense of 
institutional change (Thelen, 2003, p. 234).  Katznelson (2003, p. 283) points to this 
deficiency, arguing that scholarship has yet to move purposefully in this direction.  
Consequently, any new, or revised, instruments should be welcomed.  This paper 
elaborated a theoretical framework to evaluate critical junctures.  This will help in 
assessing claims about the significance of change. 
Employing the criteria set out above for specifying a critical juncture will help 
researchers make more plausible claims that certain outcomes were critical junctures, 
or watershed, and other were not.  Along with elaborating the theoretical framework 
with which one evaluates critical junctures, this could represent a big advance for 
historical institutionalism and path-dependent research.  An understanding of critical 
junctures would provide us with a means of defining the starting point for any path 
dependent analysis, solving the infinite regress problem. 
The paper sought to set within its theoretical context, and test, the revised 
critical junctures approach.  The remoulded approach, possessing clarity, rigour, and a 
focus on context previously lacking in the literature, was employed in examining 
change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1959 (See Figure 3).  At that 
time the economy was in crisis, and the unions’ influence over public policy 
underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature.  The empirical-
theoretical fit, as set out in Table 1, was very high for both hypotheses, confirming 
there had been a critical juncture in the ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1959. 
With the systemisation of standards it was easier identify a critical juncture.  
The remoulded approach reduces uncertainty surrounding the concept.  Most 
importantly, the remoulded critical junctures approach is applicable to any research 
concerned with the identification of change.  This raises the prospect of wide ranging 
research employing the remoulded critical junctures approach in future. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE GRID FOR ALL FOUR COUNTRIES 
 
  
Change (Significant, Swift, and Enduring) 
  YES NO 
 
Generative Cleavage 
(Macroeconomic Crisis) 
 
YES 
 
 
Ireland 1959 
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NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Ireland’s Main Economic Indicators, 1949 – 1969  
Year Unemployment  Inflation  Government 
Debt to GNP 
ratio 
Growth Rates 
in Real Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Industrial 
Disputes days 
lost (thou) 
Economic 
Openness 
1950 7.5 0.0  1.9 217 70.93345 
1951 7.3 11.25 49.9 1.9 545 82.55222 
1952 9.1 10.1  2.26 529 69.63176 
1953 9.6 2.04  2.5 82 66.85665 
1954 8.1 2.0  0.9 67 65.45109 
1955 6.8 1.9  1.9 236 67.17816 
1956 7.7 4.4 52.9 -1.45 48 60.98576 
1957 9.2 2.57 53.7 0.98 92 62.7357 
1958 8.6 2.6 54.2 -2.2 126 62.86433 
1959 8.0 -0.85 55.5 4.1 124 62.73207 
1960 6.7 0.86 57.5 5.0 80 64.68637 
1961 5.0 2.8 57.8 3.2 377 69.80739 
1962 4.8 4.3 58.3 3.1 104 66.89395 
1963 5.0 2.5 58.93 4.7 234 69.97402 
1964 4.7 6.7 55.2 3.8 545 70.08703 
1965 4.6 5.0 58.7 1.9 556 74.32474 
1966 4.7 3.0 59.7 0.7 784 75.72556 
1967 5.0 4.8 58.3 4.8 183 74.11819 
1968 5.0 5.0 59.2 8.1 406 79.36693 
1969 5.0 7.4 55.9 4.7 936 79.29319 
 
Appendix B 
 
ICTU Representation on Committees pre and post 1959 
 1957/1958 1960/1961 
Industrial 
Relations 
Factories Advisory Council 
Safety Committees 
National Joint Committee on the 
Human Sciences 
Human Problems in Industry 
Hours of Work 
Transport Committee 
Employer Labour Confernece 
Factories Advisory Council 
Safety Committees 
National Joint Committee on the 
Human Sciences 
Human Problems in Industry 
Hours of Work 
Transport Committee 
Apprenticeships Committee 
Harbour Boards 
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Economic 
and Social 
Price Advisory Committee 
Commission on Income Tax 
Company Law Reform Committee 
NIEC  
Price Advisory Committee 
Commission on Income Tax 
Company Law Reform Committee 
Price Advisory Committee 
Irish National Prodictivity Committee 
Economic Committee 
Committee on Industrial Organisation 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Membership Changes in ITCU and CIU (pre 1959); and ICTU (post 1959) 
 
Membership Annual Rate of 
Change % 
Employment 
Density % 
Workforce 
Density %  
     
1955 316,400 +1.7 45.6 42.7 
1956 316,500 0.0 46.2 43.1 
1957 308,200 -2.5 46.5 42.3 
1958 306,800 -0.4 46.9 42.4 
1959 313,700 +2.2 47.9 43.7 
1960 325,500 3.8 50.2 45.8 
1961 335,600 +3.1 52.4 48.2 
1962 348,500 +3.8 53.5 49.4 
1963 351,000 +0.7 53.0 48.9 
1964 362,300 +3.2 53.8 49.9 
1965 371,900 +2.6 54.4 50.7 
1966 372,500 +0.2 53.7 49.9 
1967 377,700 +1.4 54.2 50.2 
1968 389,800 +3.2 55.1 50.8 
1969 409,200 +5.0 57.0 52.9 
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